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The method for torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib was chosen because it
was assumed that the Islamic modesty system, or hejab, makes Muslims
especially vulnerable to shame. Through an examination of the films of
the Iranian filmmaker, Abbas Kiarostami, who directs films under the
censorship rules imposed by hejab, and an examination of the philosoph-
ical and psychoanalytic literature on shame, this paper calls into ques-
tion both the assumption of the torturers and many of the restraints of
the modesty system.
I ranian films are an exotic experience for audiences accustomed toHollywood-dominated cinema. Not just for obvious reasons, but be-cause the obvious - the foreign locations and people, everything we
actually see on screen - is produced by a different distribution of the visible
and the invisible and an alien logic of the look.
One of the most spectacular heralds of Iran’s 1978-1979 Islamic Revo-
lution was the torching of spectacle. Movie theatres - in one horrific case,
with the audience still in it - were set on fire, incinerated by fundamental-
ists. Fittingly, in this respect, Khomeini spoke, in his very first public ap-
pearance as Iran’s new leader, not only of his intent to restore the authority
of the mullahs and purge the country of all foreign influences, Eastern and
Western; he also directly addressed the question of cinema. As might be ex-
pected, he vehemently denounced it as “prostitution,” as the “Shah’s cine-
ma,” but he deliberately refrained from banning it outright as a wicked mod-
ern invention. For, even he could recognize the value of film, the potential
for mobilizing it for his grand scheme of re-educating the people in the ways
of Islam. Post-revolutionary Iran witnessed the flourishing of a heavily sub-
sidized and officially promoted cinema, though one strictly regulated by the
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Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which explicitly forbade the
smallest details betraying foreign influence - such as the wearing of ties or
bow ties, the smoking of cigarettes, the drinking of alcohol, and so on - and,
more globally, any infraction of the Islamic system of hejab. In its strictest
sense, hejab is a veil or cloth covering for women that obscures them from
the sight of men to whom they are not related; but in its widest sense it is
the entire “system of modesty” that conceals the very shape of women,
which always risks being revealed through gesture and movement. Indeed,
hejab seems to be motivated by the belief that there is something about
women that can never be covered up enough and thus the task of veiling is
buttressed by architectural design and rigid social protocols that further pro-
tect women from exposure.
The impact of hejab regulations on cinema was massive.1 Not only the
figure and movement of the woman, but the very look directed at her need-
ed to be veiled. Strictures against the eros of the unrelated meant that not
even religiously allowed forms of erotic engagement between men and
women could be represented, since filming exposed women to the ex-
tradiegetic look of the director, crew, and, of course, the audience. Thus the
look of desire around which Hollywood-dominated cinema is plotted had to
be forsaken, along with the well-established system of relaying that look
through an alternating pattern of shots and counter-shots and the telling in-
sertion of psychologically motivated close-ups. Besides restricting narrative
situations and tabooing the most common style of editing, the system of
modesty also obliged any filmmaker committed to maintaining a modicum
of realism to shoot outdoors. Although in real life Iranian women need not
and do not wear head-scarves at home, in cinematic interiors they were
forced to don them because of the presence, once again, of the extradiegetic
look, which exposed them to the view of unrelated men. Incongruous images
of headscarves in scenes of family intimacy were more than unrealistic; they
were oftentimes risible and thus filmmakers tended to avoid domestic scenes
as much as possible. Ultimately, then, interiority was one of the most signif-
icant cinematic casualties of hejab. Iranian cinema came to be composed
only of exterior shots, whether in the form of actual spatial exteriors - the
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1. The regulations aimed at “Islamicizing” Iranian cinema were ratified and the Min-
istry of Culture and Islamic Guidance instituted in February 1983. Hamid Naficy pro-
vides the most comprehensive and cogent analysis of the impact of these regulations
on Iranian films. See, in particular, his “Veiled Vision/Powerful Presences: Women
in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema.”
improbable abundance of rural landscapes and city streets, which is a hall-
mark of Iranian cinema - or in the form of virtual exteriors - interior domes-
tic spaces in which women remained veiled and isolated from desire, outside
the reach of any affectionate or passionate caress. The challenge facing all
Iranian filmmakers, then, is to make credible and compelling films under
these conditions, namely: the censorship of interiority, of intimacy.
Revelations of American torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib
brought to light an abusive misunderstanding of the Islamic system of mod-
esty. It turns out that The Arab Mind, a book first published in 1973 and
reprinted only a few months prior to the invasion of Iraq, got into the hands
of pro-war Washington conservatives and became, in the words of one aca-
demic, “the bible of the neo-cons on Arab behavior” (Hersh). Of special in-
terest to these conservatives was a chapter on Arabs and sex which argued
that, “The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of women . . . and all the oth-
er minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women,
have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab
world” (Hersh). It was this sort of speculation which was responsible for
planting the idea that shame would be the most effective device for break-
ing Iraqi prisoners down psychologically (Hersh). According to a report in
The New Yorker, two themes emerged as “talking points” in the discussions
of the strategists: 1) “Arabs only understand force” and 2) “the biggest
weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation” (Hersh). In brief, shame was
chosen as the method of torture precisely because the torturers believed that
Arab culture made the prisoners particularly vulnerable to it.
This belief was nourished on the banquet of that crude, and one would
have thought, thoroughly discredited sociological division of the world into
“guilt cultures” and “shame cultures.” The distinction classifies guilt as an af-
fect characteristic of advanced cultures, whose members have graduated to
the stage where they possess an internal principle of morality, and shame as
a “primitive” affect characteristic of cultures forced to rely, for want of such
a principle, on the approving or disapproving gaze of other people to moni-
tor morality. Let me focalize my criticisms by offering my own curt and con-
trary thesis: the affects of shame and guilt are improperly used to define kinds
of cultures; for, what they define, rather, is a subject’s relation to her culture.
I use culture here to refer to a form of life that we inherit at birth, to all those
things - such as family, race, ethnicity, and national identity - we do not
choose, but which choose us. Call them gifts of our ancestors. The manner in
which we assume this inheritance, and the way we understand what it means
to keep faith with it, are, I argue, what determine shame or guilt.
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Distancing herself from this dubious correlation of affects with stages
of cultural and moral development, Eve Sedgwick offers an alternative to
the neo-conservative view of shame while reflecting on her own experience
of shame in the aftermath of another violent confrontation between Ameri-
ca and Islam, the attack of September 11. Sedgwick tells us that she was
suddenly overcome by shame whenever she happened, after September 11,
to catch a glimpse of the void that now occupied the site where the Twin
Towers once stood.2 This odd example of the affect is well suited to her ar-
gument, first because it effectively illustrates the point that shame is not
caused by prohibition or repression. If the occasion of shame is the surpris-
ing of my own look by another that “overlooks” it, this second, alien look
must not be construed as one of condemnation, disapproval, or prohibition.
My look is deflected or disarmed, not by any (negative) judgment, but in re-
sponse to the rupturing of an interpersonal bridge, the interruption of the
comforting circuit of recognition by which my look sends back to me an im-
age that confirms my identity. My look is interrupted by a blank stare, a
voided vision. Like most New Yorkers, Sedgwick no doubt relied on the re-
assuring sight of the Towers to orient herself in the city; their absence then
represented a disappointment of expectations and a loss of familiar coordi-
nates. The blush or, “betraying blazon of an interrupted narcissistic circuit”
(41) that arose in response may have represented a bruise to her urban iden-
tity, but this bruise was not accompanied by any sentiment of rejection or
abjection. Rather, a kind of group feeling, a feeling of solidarity with others
arose along with the wound. This paradox has often been commented upon:
shame is at once the most isolating of feelings and a basic social response,
a movement “toward individuation and toward uncontrollable relationality,”
or social contagion (37).3
The challenge to understanding shame lies in interpreting this paradox.
The one unfortunate error Sedgwick makes is to insist that the shame she felt
after 9/11 was not for herself, but for the missing Towers; that is, she interprets
the social sentiment as a feeling of shame for or on behalf of something oth-
er than herself. In so doing she gives shame an object, the missing edifices.
The effect of this error was to permit a whole literature on shame to sprout
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2. See Cartwright and Benin for an interesting use of the work of Sedgwick and Silvan
Tomkins.
3. On this paradox, see also Cavell: “Shame is the most isolating of feelings but also the
most primitive of social responses . . . simultaneously the discovery of the isolation
of the individual, his presence to himself, but also to others” (286).
within queer theory whereby queers take themselves as the despised objects
of shame and in a second, compensatory movement convert the common trait
of their abjection into a badge of honor and the basis of group feeling. Shame
in other words is here thought to bind individuals into a group by becoming
that which they share: they form the group of all rejected or excepted from the
larger group of the “normal.” This disastrous misunderstanding can begin to
be challenged by making it clear that the phrase “shame for” is, strictly s-
peaking, a solecism. I feel shame neither for myself nor for others because
shame is intransitive; it has no object. Shame is there in place of an object in
the ordinary sense (though, as we will see, shame is “not without object” or,
in the Lacanian vocabulary, it concerns the object a). To experience shame is
to experience oneself not as a despised or degraded object, but to experience
oneself as a subject. I am not ashamed of myself, I am the shame I feel: shame
is there in the place of an object. Giorgio Agamben puts this clearly when he
designates shame as the “proper emotive tonality of subjectivity” (Remnants
of Auschwitz 110), as “the fundamental sentiment of being a subject” (107).
The entire thrust of Sedgwick’s argument, in fact, goes in this direction;
shame, she says, is the sentiment that “attaches to and sharpens the sense of
who one is” (37). The searing pain associated with shame is not one of being
turned by another into an object, of being degraded; it has to do with the fact
that one is not “integrated” with oneself (44), one is fundamentally split from
oneself. (But isn’t this the very definition of a subject?) 
Let us delay for a bit the full explication of the paradox of shame to
turn once more to the Islamic system of modesty which we will view
through the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, one of the most famous directors
to make films under this system. What gives the neo-conservative associa-
tion of shame and hejab its legs, of course, is the fact that they both involve
veiling. In the modesty system and in shame a barrier is erected, a curtain
drawn; looks are averted and heads bowed. On first approach, then, no di-
rector would seem to be more in tune with the hejab system than Kiarosta-
mi, for his is a cinema of respectful reserve and restraint. This reserve is ex-
pressed most emblematically in his preference for what can be described as
“discreet” long-shots. In moments of dramatic intimacy, especially - a skit-
tish suitor’s approach to the girl he loves; the meeting between a man who
impersonates another and the man he impersonates - Kiarostami’s camera
tends to hold back, to separate itself from the action by inserting a distance
between itself and the scene and refusing to venture forward into the private
space of the characters. So marked is the tactfulness of his camera that
Kiarostami sometimes seems a reluctant filmmaker.
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In light of this overall filming strategy, one sequence from The Wind
Will Carry Us (1999) stands out as an aberration. In this sequence, Behzad
- a documentary filmmaker who has traveled to the Kurdish village of Siah-
Darreh with his crew to film the ceremony of scarification still practiced by
mourning villagers after someone from the village dies - biding his time as
he awaits the imminent death of Mrs. Malek, the village’s oldest inhabitant,
amuses himself by attempting to purchase some fresh milk from Zeynab, a
young village girl and the fiancée of a grave digger he has befriended.
Hamid Dabashi, author of a book on Iranian cinema and normally a great
admirer of Kiarostami, excoriates the director for the utter shamelessness of
this sequence in which, in Dabashi’s view, an Iranian woman’s privacy and
dignity are raped by a boorish Iranian man, whose crime is all the more of-
fensive for being paraded before the eyes of the world (251-59).4 This is
what Dabashi sees: Behzad descending into a hidden, underground space,
penetrating the darkness that protects a shy, unsophisticated village girl
from violation, and aggressively trying to expose her, despite her obvious
resistance, to the light from the lamp he tries to shine on her, to his incau-
tious look, his lies, and his sexual seduction.
Anxiety and the “Inexpressible Flavor of the Absolute”
Before offering an alternative reading of this sequence, I want to set out the
background that allows me to distinguish my reading from that of Dabashi.
His disdain for Behzad is heavily informed by his assessment of the protag-
onist as simply a Tehrani interloper adrift in rural Iran. This reading of the
puzzled and sometimes combative disorientation of Behzad - a characteris-
tic he shares with many of Kiarostami’s protagonists, who are almost all
screen doubles of the director - is a common one: geographically and cul-
turally displaced, the modern urban sophisticate finds himself at a loss
amidst rural peoples and traditions. One is obliged to note, however, that it
is as much the peri-urban character of these rural areas as their pristine prim-
itiveness, notably in decline, which catches Kiarostami’s eye. Cell phone re-
ception may not always be good in the villages, but new telecommunica-
tions systems are already being installed and the sight of random television
antennas on thatched roofs assures us that no one in this part of the world
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4. Hamid Dabashi’s otherwise highly informative Close-Up: Iranian Cinema, Past,
Present and Future explodes into an unfair (to my mind) rant against The Wind Will
Carry Us in its final chapter.
need miss a simulcast soccer game. Regarding the traditional ceremony of
scarification, for example, we learn in the course of the film that it has been
retrofitted, turned long ago into a means of advancing oneself on the pro-
fessional ladder. Whenever a relative of one of the bosses dies, the workers
compete for the distinction of being the most loyal mourner, exhibiting their
self-scarred faces and bodies in hopes of impressing their boss and being re-
warded with a promotion. Incipient capitalism is here in bed with tradition-
al culture, exploiting rather than eliminating it.
This abbreviation of the distance between Behzad and the villagers
does not exonerate his insensitive behavior, but it does suggest that we need
to look elsewhere for an explanation for his disorientation, which is more
profound than the narrative alibi implies. Like other Kiarostami protago-
nists, Behzad behaves, I will argue, less like a rootless or de-territorialized
modern man, than like one who has been uprooted from this unrootedness
to become riveted to a culture, a land, an ethnicity that is opaque to him and
which he tries, without much success, to understand by engaging in a
quasi-ethnographic exploration of them. That modernity melted everything
solid into air is an exaggerated claim, but it was expected to soften at least
all that had been solid to the consistency of clay, to render everything, in-
cluding the subject, infinitely pliable, manipulable. Contrary to expecta-
tions, however, modern, supposedly malleable, man found himself stuck to
something, to a bit of reality that tore him from the free-flowing current of
modern life. It is as if a drain hole or counterforce were inexplicably opened
in the modern world, lending our fleeting “temporal existence . . . the inex-
pressible flavor of the absolute . . . [and giving rise to] an acute feeling of
being held fast” (Levinas 52).5 That this riveting or reterritorialization is a
confounding fact of modern life and no mere theoretical abstraction is evi-
denced most notably in all the stubborn outbreaks of national, ethnic, racial,
and religious loyalties at a moment when such loyalties could have been
expected to dissipate.
As is known, modernity was founded on a definitive break with the au-
thority of our ancestors, who were no longer conceived as the ground for our
actions or beliefs. And yet this effective undermining of their authority con-
fronted us with another difficulty; it is as if in rendering our ancestors falli-
ble, we had transformed the past from the repository of their already ac-
complished deeds and discovered truths into a kind of holding cell of all that
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was unactualized and unthought. The desire of our ancestors and thus the
virtual past, the past that had never come to pass, or was not yet finished,
weighed disturbingly on us, pressing itself on our attention.
The theorization of this unfinished past is concentrated, in the West,
around the concept of anxiety.6 If it seemed necessary to come to terms the-
oretically with anxiety - as it did to Kierkegaard, Freud, and Heidegger, a-
mong others - this is surely because this affect bore witness to this new re-
lation to the past. The assumption that modern man would become pliable -
to market forces or the force of his own will, depending on the starting point
of one’s argument - rested on the belief that the break with an authoritative
past placed a zero in the denominator of our foundations, rooted us in or
attached us to - nothing. Anxiety, the affect that arises in moments when
radical breaks in the continuity of existence occur, belies this assumption.
Strangely, anxiety often overtakes revolutionaries immediately after a revo-
lution, which seems not to free the hand that would draft a new constitution,
but to paralyze it. How to understand this curious phenomenon? While
many psychoanalytic thinkers conceived anxiety as the affective response to
loss or abandonment, Freud insisted that the proper response to loss would
be mourning - not anxiety. Like Freud, the philosophers mentioned con-
ceived anxiety as dependent not on an actual condition, albeit one of loss,
but rather on “a condition that is not.” Kierkegaard offered a clarifying il-
lustration of the difference: the feeling of anxiety is not captured, he said, by
the complaint, “My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” but rather by the en-
treaty, “Whatever you are going to do Lord, do quickly!” (155). Anxiety is
the experience not of a loss that has happened but the experience of await-
ing some event, something that has not happened.
The break instituted by modernity did not cause the past to become ef-
fectively dead to us; its retreat turned out to be modal (that is, it became a
matter of the virtual, not the actual past) rather than total. We were thus left
not simply alone in a cloistral present cut off from our ancestors, but found
ourselves alone with something that did not clearly manifest itself. Anxiety
is this feeling of being anchored to an alien self which we are neither able
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6. My implication is that we should look also to Islamic philosophy for a theory of the
“unfinished past.” See, for example, Corbin’s “Prologue” to his study of Islamic phi-
losophy in Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi’ite Iran:
“Our authors suggest that if our past were really what we believe it to be, that is,
completed and closed, it would not be the grounds for such vehement discussions.
They suggest that all our acts of understanding are so many recommencements, re-
iterations of events still unconcluded” (xxix).
to separate ourselves from nor able to assume as our own, of being con-
nected to a past that, insofar as it had not happened, was impossible to shed.
Our implication in the past was thus deepened. For, while formerly a sub-
ject’s ties to her past were strictly binding, they were experienced as exter-
nal, as of the order of simple constraint. One had to submit to a destiny one
did not elect and often experienced as unjust. But one could - like Job or the
heroes and heroines of classical tragedies - rail against one’s destiny, curse
one’s fate. With modernity this is no longer possible. The “God of destiny”
is now dead and we no longer inherit the debts of our ancestors, but become
that debt. We cannot distance ourselves sufficiently from the past to be able
to curse the fate it hands us, but must, as Lacan put it, “bear as jouissance
the injustice that horrifies us” (Séminaire VIII 155, translation mine). What
does this mean?
We can answer this question by returning to the hand paralyzed by anx-
iety. If, stricken by anxiety, my hand goes on strike, refuses to write, it is be-
cause it has become saturated with libido or gripped by jouissance. My hand
behaves, Freud explains, like a maid who, having begun a love affair with
her master, refuses to continue doing her household chores (88-89).7 In
the moment of anxiety, we are gripped by our own jouissance as the very
object-cause of our actions, but the experience is of being parasitized by an
alien object so suffocatingly close that we cannot discern what it is. In his
essay on Melville’s Bartelby - the scrivener who goes on strike because he
prefers not to fulfill the tasks he was hired for - Agamben unintentionally
suggests a way to push Freud’s argument further. The essay is not about
anxiety but about potentiality and Agamben’s primary argument is that if
potentiality were only a potential to be or do something, we could not ex-
perience it as such, since it would dissolve into the experience of actually
existing or doing something (“Bartleby, or On Contingency”).8 But because
we do experience a potentiality distinct from actuality, we must then sup-
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7. “Analysis shows that when activities like . . . writing . . . are subjected to neurotic in-
hibitions it is because . . . the fingers . . . have become too strongly eroticized. It has
been discovered as a general fact that the ego-function of an organ is impaired if its
erotogenicity - its sexual significance - is increased. It behaves, if I may be allowed
a rather absurd analogy, like a maid-servant who refuses to go on cooking because
her master has started a love-affair with her” (Freud 89-90). Note that it is the “ego-
function” which is impaired; the eroticized fingers, in becoming eroticized, are en-
dowed with pure potentiality.
8. Interestingly, Agamben’s essay makes note of the important contribution of Islamic
philosophers to the concept of potentiality.
pose that there exists an impotentiality, a potential not to be or do, that pre-
cedes potentiality. Bartelby becomes the exemplary figure of this impoten-
tiality, the first manifestation of a subject’s power or capacity. Psychoanaly-
sis, we well know, names this capacity libido (or jouissance) and it, too, ac-
knowledges that this capacity must first be the power to not be or do when
it posits the existence of the death drive. If one is committed to the existence
of libido or jouissance, it is necessary to believe in the speculative notion of
the death drive. Anxiety can be understood as the affect that registers our en-
counter with the death drive - or our own capacity as such. This capacity is
not at the behest of autonomous will, however, but attaches us, rather, to the
ontologically incomplete past into which we are born, or: jouissance is the
affective result of our relation to ancestral desire. 
That Kiarostami’s films are haunted by such an inexplicable attachment
to the past is clear enough. Cemeteries are a characteristic topos of the films.
In The Wind Will Carry Us, for example, one of the primary locations of the
film is the cemetery in which Youssef, a gravedigger, digs continuously
throughout the film. Youssef remains underground for most of the film and
is thus invisible to us, as are several other characters. Asked by an inter-
viewer what these curious visual absences signified, Kiarostami replied that
the film was about “beings without being” (“Taste of Kiarostami”). Eventu-
ally the ground caves in on Youssef, who has to be dug out. The unsteadi-
ness of the ground is not, however, unique to this film; it is a constant in
Kiarostami’s work, where the earth is always caving in, buckling, heaving,
quaking. Scarred by cavernous pits, filmed at angles that suggest they might
at any moment swallow up built structures and people, the ground continu-
ously throws up rubble and forces inconvenient detours. In other words, the
ground, like the past buried in it, turns out to be in these films a very unset-
tled affair. It is as if the past itself were constantly under construction.
In Where Is the Friend’s House? (1986) this disturbing, anxiogenic sur-
plus takes the form of a notebook which a young school boy is sure is not
his own, though it appears in all particulars exactly like his. He spends the
majority of the film trying to return it, unsuccessfully, mysteriously decid-
ing in the end not to give it back to its ostensible owner but instead to write
an original composition in it. In Taste of Cherry (1997), this strange surplus
fails to take a concrete form and instead infuses the film with a perplexing
textual opacity. The film follows a middle-aged man, Mr. Badii, who has no
discernible reason for discontent (far from it) and yet spends the entire film
trying to find an accomplice to his suicide, one who will promise to cover
him with twenty shovels-full of dirt and double check to make sure he is re-
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ally and truly dead. From this we suspect that Mr. Badii is bothered by a fear
of being buried alive. It is as if he were trying not simply to suicide himself
but to extinguish some excess of self that does not respond to his wishes and
thus impresses him as capable of surviving even his death.
Speaking in an interview about Taste of Cherry, Kiarostami offered this
comment: “the choice of death is the only prerogative possible . . . because
everything in our lives has been imposed by birth . . . our parents, our home,
our nationality, our build, the color of our skin, our culture” (Kiarostami 85;
qtd. in Goudet 1). Though Mr. Badii has no personal complaint, the thick
presence of militia, the oppressive evidence of poverty, and the dust of
industrialization visible in the urban perimeter through which he drives
suggests choking. His suicide is thus readable as an attempt to escape the
suffocation brought on by a world where one’s identity is laid down by au-
thorities who leave no room for freedom. And yet this sociological reading
- of the film and Kiarostami’s statement about the film - can only be expe-
rienced as insufficient insofar as it neglects the “absolute” dimension to
which the film bears witness. What Mr. Badii cannot abide is being stuck
to the opaque desire of his ancestors. He seeks through suicide not just the
actual restrictions his culture imposes, but the restrictive space in which he
finds himself bound to its unreadable imperative. 
The Affective Tonality of Capitalism
In his seminar on anxiety Lacan protests against the time-honored distinc-
tion between fear and anxiety which maintains that anxiety is without object
as opposed to fear, which is always transitive. He insists instead that anxi-
ety is “not without object” (Seminar X). This is a restatement not a denial of
the original distinction, for Lacan does not negate the negation of anxiety’s
object, he qualifies it. Replacing the absolute negation, “without object,”
with a conditional negation, he makes anxiety a matter of what does not now
or not yet objectively exist. This qualification brings Lacan closer to
Kierkegaard’s “condition which is not” and acknowledges that if anxiety has
no actual or realized object, it is nevertheless not pure delusion either. What
grips us in anxiety is not nothing, even if it has no objective existence.
I have lingered so long on anxiety because our primary topic, shame, is
almost incomprehensible if we do not start out from a consideration of it.
What is fundamental to both affects is this non-actualized, unassumable ob-
ject which sticks to us like a semi-autonomous shadow. In his early work,
On Escape, Emmanuel Levinas in fact scarcely distinguishes between these
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affects except to characterize shame as the dashed hope of escape from the
alien object that uproots us in anxiety. Like others, including Freud and La-
can, Levinas characterizes anxiety as a kind of state of emergency, the ex-
perience of a signal or imperative to Flee! Escape! In his account, however,
it is only when the hiccup of hope sustained by this imperative bursts that
we finally enter into shame. With shame I am forced to accept that I am that,
that object which sticks to me, even though I do not know what that is and
cannot figure out how to integrate it. My question is this: is it really hope
which is dissipated in shame or is it rather the imperative to escape? And if
it is the imperative, what becomes of it? 
In Levinas the imperative experience of anxiety is thought of only as
one that compels escape from the unintegratable object. We would ask,
however: into what can we escape? Anxiety is rarely experienced in the
raw; something like the “stem cell” of affects, it is more often encountered
in another form, in one of the “social affects” of guilt or shame, which we
can describe as two socially differentiated forms of anxiety accompanying
two different organizations of our relation to our potentiality and to our
past. In brief, anxiety can best be understood as the imperative to (escape
into) sociality. Unable to discern our own desire, to know who we are, we
feel compelled to flee into sociality in an attempt to find there some image
of ourselves. The society of others serves a civilizing function not, as is
usually said, because it tames primitive animal instincts, but because it
colonizes our savage, inhuman jouissance by allowing us to acquire some
self-image.
Now, it is against this backdrop that we will approach the “shame se-
quence” in The Wind Will Carry Us. The problem I have with Dabashi’s
reading has nothing to do with the revulsion it expresses toward Behzad,
whose actions are inexcusable. As he hangs around Siah-Darreh waiting for
Mrs. Malek to die, he occupies himself not only by bothering Zeynab, but
also by trying to take photographs of villagers who do not want their pic-
tures taken. The film indicts him for his rudeness and indiscretion, but in
what precisely do these crimes consist? If every subject needs to escape anx-
iety in order to find out who he is, to appear on the public stage whence he
can return to himself some self-image, why is Behzad’s attempt to offer the
villagers photographic images of themselves counted as an act of rudeness
or malice, rather than an act of kindness? One of the villagers in Life and
Nothing More (1991) answers this question when he complains to Farhad,
the film director in that film, that the images of the villagers his camera cap-
tures make them appear worse than they are. 
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In what way can images make us appear worse than we are? Behzad
and Farhad both travel to the villages to document what is there to be seen,
ultimately in order to archive phenomena on the verge of disappearing.
Their mission is to capture a world in the midst of fading, people about to
die or presumed lost, ritual practices on the edge of extinction. This archival
ambition licenses their rudeness, justifies in their minds their indiscreet at-
tempts to find out what the villagers prefer not to disclose. The fundamen-
tal problem, however - which is nevertheless related to the conviction that
all phenomena are merely transitory - is that these nosey archivists believe
that what is being hidden from them is something which discloses itself to
those who try to hide it. In other words, what the diegetic directors disregard
while making their images is the very jouissance or unrealized surplus of
self which makes each villager opaque to herself. The directors rob them of
that and thus reduce them to disappearing phenomena. 
If we admit that Behzad behaves, as Dabashi believes, in an obscene
fashion, we must be prepared to say in what this obscenity consists. The
same goes for the charge as it is leveled against the Abu Ghraib photo-
graphs. It is often said that the photographs invaded the prisoners’ privacy,
exposed it to the eyes of the world. But this claim does not go far enough.
The obscenity of the Abu Ghraib photographs, as with those taken by Be-
hzad, consists in their implicit assumption that there is no obscene, no off-
screen, that cannot be exposed to a persistent, prying look. The two sets of
photographs result from the same obscene denial: they deny that the prison-
ers and the villagers are exposed to their own otherness to themselves. This
otherness to ourselves is what constitutes the only interiority we have; it is
our privacy. Thus the ultimate crime of the photographers is to proceed as if
the prisoners and villagers have no privacy to invade.
At the close of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche expressed his scorn for
his contemporaries’ stupid insistence on trying to “see through everything”
(263). He protested the lack of reverence and discretion which fueled their
tactless attempt to “touch, lick, and finger everything” (213). The phenom-
enon Nietzsche decried is the frenzied desire we still see all around us, the
desire to cast aside every veil, penetrate every surface, transgress every bar-
rier in order to get our hands on the real thing lying behind it. We seem to
have installed in the modern world a new “beyondness,” a new untouchable,
or a new secularized sacred, one that inspires a new desire for transgression.
This secularized sacred originates not in a belief in the existence of another
world, but from the belief that what we want in this world always lies be-
hind a barrier which prevents our access to it.
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The rough desire to brush aside barriers and veils arises through a spe-
cific structuring of our relation to our culture which we can call guilt. Com-
mon to the affects of anxiety, guilt, and shame is our sense of an inalienable
and yet unintegratable surplus of self. In guilt this surplus weighs on us no
longer as the burden of an unfinished past, but as the unfinished business of
the present. The sentiment of our opacity to ourselves is disavowed and in
its place arises the sentiment of being excluded from ourselves by exterior
barriers. In short, we treat ourselves with the same measure of obscenity as
we treat others, denying ourselves any privacy in the true sense. The mech-
anisms of this conversion of anxiety into guilt are the social and ego ideals
which relieve us of the responsibility of having to invent a future without the
aid of rules or scripts. Ideals give our actions directions, goals to strive for,
and thus alleviate the overwhelming sentiment of anxiety. But because
ideals are unattainable, by definition, the (bitter) taste of the absolute is still
discernible in them through the experience of the elusive beyond they bring
into existence.
The Kurdish villagers are submitted not only to Behzad’s indiscretions
but also to their own obscene desire to expose another layer of themselves,
to cut deeper into their own skin in order to obtain the kind of recognition
for which they have begun to thirst. Siah-Darreh seems poised not only to
participate in capitalist development, but also to develop a new relation to
their cultural past. The unbearable question of who we are was no sooner
raised by modernity than resolved by capitalism as a matter no longer of be-
ing, but of possessing an identity. Like all possessions, identity turned out to
be susceptible to measurement. One could have more or less of it, better or
worse forms of it, but one cannot fully acquire it. Around this insufficiency
a traffic in identity grows up and the value of modesty recedes drastically.
Exposure
It is the expansion of capitalism and the prevalence of the structure of guilt
supporting it which has made the all-but-extinct affect of shame seem
primitive. It is also responsible for making the Islamic system of modesty,
with its volatile disdain for the modern, capitalist passion for exposing
everything, seem anachronistic, as it did to the author of The Arab Mind and
it does to Behzad. Thus we return to the sequence in which he attempts to
penetrate the darkness of the improbable grotto where Zeynab spends her
days. My reading will focus not on the shamelessness of Behzad (which
stoops to its depths here), but on the awakening of shame in Zeynab.
As Behzad crosses the threshold of this dark place, the screen goes
completely black for several seconds. A long, dark corridor lodges itself be-
tween the sunny exterior where a young, unveiled girl plays and the inside.
As we watch the empty screen we are given ample time to experience the
darkness in which Zeynab will be found. Like a prosecutor who counts out
for the jury the seconds - “one one-thousand, two one-thousand, three . . . ”
- it took to strangle the victim, Kiarostami holds on the black screen for an
uncomfortably long time. Meanwhile, the voice of Behzad inquires, “Is
there anyone here?” This is a profound question answerable in the negative.
There is no one here, no “I,” only the milking of a cow, the action Zeynab
is performing, substantivized, lacking a subject.
Surely one of the most famous scenes of shame is the one presented in
Being and Nothingness where a voyeur is startled while peering through a
keyhole by the sound of rustling leaves. Sartre makes the point that it is on-
ly at this moment when the voyeur feels himself being observed by another
that he acquires the sentiment of self. Sartre insists also on a point Sedgwick
later emphasizes in her discussion of shame: the gaze of the Other does not
judge, condemn, or prohibit; the voyeur is not made to feel shame for him-
self nor for his act of lascivious looking. The gaze functions, rather, as an
“indispensable mediator” between the voyeur and himself, the condition
necessary for precipitating him out as subject from the act of looking in
which he has until this point been totally absorbed (Sartre 369). Without this
intervention there would be no subject, only peering through a keyhole. The
meeting between Behzad and Zeynab invites us to reconsider Sartre’s point
in the fullness of its political implications. Zeynab requires an intervention,
the presence of others as such, in order to emerge from the milking, from the
gerundive form of her impoverished existence, as a subject. In the absence
of this intervention she remains something less than that. 
In the standard reading, Sartre’s shame scenario is made to seem a ba-
thetic drama in which a supposedly abstract and sovereign act of looking is
forced to confront its anchorage in the vulnerability of its bodily founda-
tions. The rustling of leaves functions as a kind of index finger that picks out
the voyeur, rendering him painfully conspicuous, a body too much, in a
scene where he thought himself bodiless and unobserved, a spectral spec-
tating instance. The emperor of seeing is abruptly laid bare. If this reading
of the shame scenario is so unshakeable it is because it captures the squirmi-
ness of shame, the feeling that something of ourselves which “ought to have
remained hidden” is suddenly exposed, and exposed as belonging to us un-
deniably. And yet however vividly the exposure of one’s nakedness, of one’s
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body, evokes the feeling of shame (the sight of the cow’s udders as they are
being milked by Zeynab is meant of course to evoke this uncomfortable
feeling in the film sequence), shame is obviously not reducible to an expe-
rience of being seen without one’s clothes, of being seen literally naked. Nor
is it an experience of being anchored to the dead weight of one’s own body,
to one’s body as object. In shame one finds oneself attached inescapably to
the nonobjectifiable object of one’s own jouissance and thus to one’s lived
body. What is it then that distinguishes the feeling of anxiety from the feel-
ing of shame, given that they can both be described as the sentiment of be-
ing riveted to this same unintegratable excess? The difference lies not, as
Levinas would have it, in the vanishing of all hope of escape but, rather, in
the vanishing of the imperative to escape. That imperative is replaced by an-
other: to hide, conceal, or refuse to disclose in order to protect and preserve
that inalienable and yet unassumable excess which designates me rigidly,
that is, in my uniqueness.
There is no denying that shame is not only an experience that trans-
gresses the pleasure principle, but often one of excruciating pain. The same
can be said of anxiety. With anxiety, however, our own self-distance and
self-opacity are sources of pain insofar as they threaten to annihilate us to-
tally, while with shame the threat is aimed at this opacity whose exposure
would annihilate us. We therefore seek to preserve this opacity at all costs,
even though its presence brings its own pain.
What accounts for this alteration in our relation to the troubling excess
that distances us from ourselves? We described anxiety as the sentiment of
a negative capacity to not be which we flee by choosing social existence,
where we appear not only to others but also to ourselves. A problem arises,
however, if the realm of social appearance seems to offer a poor reflection
of who we are, if in gaining an appearance we seem to lose ourselves. When
among all the images of myself and others, I remain absent; when the cost
of appearing in the world is the loss of my own gaze, of the “I” who sees
myself in my public image, then that passion we earlier associated with guilt
is aroused: to break through the façade of appearances.
The sentiment of shame is occasioned, on the contrary, when in the ex-
terior space of social existence, of public appearance, I suddenly appear in
the flesh. I see not only the public images I ordinarily see, but alongside
them, as if momentarily granted a slightly wider peripheral vision, the red
patch of my own cheeks. I appear there in the flesh alongside - at a slight
distance from - my own image as the gaze with which I look at the world
appears in the world, gazes at me and locates me there at a remove from my-
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self. This is the radical point: the gaze under which I feel myself observed
in shame is my own gaze. Lost in guilt, it is found in shame, in the space of
publicity.
Now, since this gaze is not an object in the ordinary sense, is not an eye
but the jouissance of the eye, the very potentiality of sight, it cannot and
does not appear as an object. Yet that which, strictly speaking, cannot be
seen, can and does appear or assume a sensible presence in the movement
by which “all the perspectives, the lines of force, of my world” begin to shift
in relation to the felt presence of my gaze (Lacan, Four Fundamental Con-
cepts 84). My gaze appears in the world as a shape-changer, as the sha-
peability of the forms of social existence, which I - through my jouissance,
my potentiality - have the capacity to transform. 
Here we must recall the paradox of shame whose explanation holds the
key to understanding this affect. Shame is a feeling of one’s isolation or u-
niqueness at the same time as it is an intensely social feeling. While shame
delivers an experience of our interiority, of a reserve of potentiality or jouis-
sance which sets us apart from all others, it at the same time makes this in-
teriority appear outside us, in the midst of the world. Our interiority is thus
exposed as an event in the world; it is revealed as an exposure to others. This
is another way of saying, in part, that our own jouissance or potentiality is
not felt to be at the disposal of our will, that it does not disclose to us its se-
crets. But nor do we have, in shame, the urge to disclose these secrets.
Though it is often said that shame paralyzes desire, it is not usually speci-
fied which desire is targeted. Our argument makes clear that shame puts an
end to the desire to turn our jouissance into a weapon we can possess and
wield against the social order. Shame seeks rather to preserve the secrets of
jouissance’s complicity with others, with the unknowable desire of our an-
cestors, in order then to realize that jouissance on behalf of the society of
others among whom we dwell. 
In Dabashi’s reading of the encounter between Behzad and Zeynab, it
is Behzad who brings shame to Zeynab. This misreading depends on the re-
duction of shame to the product of a simple intersubjective relation in which
the belittling or degrading look of another person is sufficient to ignite
shame. I would argue, however, that it is not Behzad who occasions shame
in Zeynab, but the erotic poem by Forough Farrokhzad, “The Wind Will
Carry Us,” which Behzad recites to Zeynab in his clumsy attempt to seduce
her. Forough’s words have an effect on Zeynab unintended by Behzad and
it is they, not the lamp he tries to shine on her, which pluck her out of the
darkness, set her apart from the act of milking that absorbs her. She is visi-
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bly fascinated and surprised by the poem. As Behzad tries to manipulate the
situation by drawing some purely external connections between Forough
and this unlettered village girl, the poem in fact gives Zeynab not a bor-
rowed identity but a sentiment of self. That is, Zeynab does not identify with
Forough, as Behzad invites her to, but experiences on hearing it the senti-
ment of self, precisely: the sentiment of shame that allows her to experience
the relatedness of her own intimacy to the fate of others. 
Sunk in darkness, Zeynab remains invisible not only to others, but also
to her self. She does not exist merely for herself but for nobody. In order to
experience herself as a subject, she requires an outer dimension, a visibility
outside herself. The poem, a significant article of her own culture, gives
Zeynab access to that outer dimension. We often hear it said that modesty is
a cultural phenomenon; one can only feel naked, they say, under our clothes.
But what is usually meant by this is that culture inhibits us sexually, makes
us self-conscious of our nakedness. Forough’s erotic poem can by no stretch
of the imagination be conceived as censorious of sexuality, nor does it make
Zeynab feel self-conscious before Behzad; quite the opposite. If modesty is,
in fact, a product of culture (and Zeynab’s modesty a product of the poem),
it is because shame makes visible the impossibility of self-consciousness. It
exposes the unobjectificable object which decenters me from myself; but it
exposes it as sandwiched between, or framed by, the forms of my culture.
The framing of the object in shame can thus be thought of as a taming of the
violence that ravishes me in anxiety. The gaze imagined by Zeynab on hear-
ing Forough’s words sees nothing, or sees the nothing-to-see, that which has
no likeness, no image, because it has no like.
We are now prepared to confront directly the thesis put forward in the
book The Arab Mind, namely that the Islamic system of modesty makes
Muslim people susceptible to shame. To the extent that the hejab system en-
courages subjects to experience their interiority, their privacy, as being intact
even while they are in a public place, as many Muslims attest, then it cer-
tainly safeguards shame in the sense we have spoken of it here - but definitely
not in the sense implied by that book. To the extent, however, that the hejab
system forbids or impedes any of its citizens access to publicity, it strips them
of the possibility of experiencing shame. Under these conditions no architec-
tural barrier, no veil, or chador will suffice to protect a citizen’s modesty.
Rather than protecting women from exposure, the limitation of their access
to public forums can only turn them inside out, externalize them completely. 
Perhaps it is the image of Behzad running around throughout the film
trying to pick up a clearer signal for his cell phone that calls to my mind the
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debates over wire tapping in the US. In these debates privacy became an is-
sue because telephone conversations necessarily traversed public space and
thus problematized the relation between the public and the private. During
these debates the Supreme Court entertained the argument that privacy
could not be localized in a delimitable space that might then be ruled out of
the reach of the State. Privacy is attached to the subject and is inviolable no
matter where a citizen may be, in public or private space. But if the subject’s
sentiment of self, her feeling of shame, intimacy, privacy, depends funda-
mentally on her relations with others as such, her freedom to engage in so-
ciety cannot be curtailed without damage to her privacy.
The question Kiarostami’s reserved cinema raises is this: how can there
be any modesty, any shame, for women such as Zeynab if they are prohib-
ited by custom, costume, or legal restrictions from appearing, from entering
public space and engaging in the relations they choose? The system of mod-
esty, I began by saying, obliged all Iranian filmmakers to limit themselves
to exterior spaces. What makes the cinema of Kiarostami uniquely interest-
ing is the way he introduces interiority, privacy, into this all-exterior world,
into the public spaces he almost exclusively films.
University of Buffalo
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